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E fflu e n t C harges - G ood G overnm ent, b u t Bad B usiness

In examining current government policy on regulating negative externalities
caused by pollution, it becomes obvious that more efficient policies are needed.
One such policy, which many economists support, is an effluent charge.
However, the groups who influence government most rarely support effluent
charges. In this paper I w ill cover common economic theory used to support
effluent charges, mention some argum ents against effluent charges, and finish
with their economic affect on business.

To establish the framework o f this paper a definition of current and new
policy are required. C urrent policy w ill be referred to in this paper as regulation.
This consists o f a government agency estim ating effluent levels o f industries, then
requiring the firm s in these industries to take specific measures that the
government agency feels w ill reduce efFluents to an optimum level. The effect of
this policy is diverse and complex, but this paper w ill consider the intent rather
than the specific regulation. The new policy being discussed w ill be called an
effluent charge throughout the paper. This consists of the government levying a
tax on firm s based on the amount of effluents produced by the firm . In this paper
this tax is assumed to be constant at all levels of effluents and consistent from firm
to firm .

There is substantial literature com paring effluent charges to regulation and
their effect on society. The three main points are: least cost, incentives, and
welfare loss. The first question is whether regulation and effluent charges are
w

least cost solutions. W hen we look at graph 1 we see the marginal control cost
curves of three firm s. The proper effluent charge is plotted on the Y axis and the
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proper regulation level is plotted on the X axis. To keep the example sim ple it is
assumed that the distance along the line plotted from the effluent charge between
firm s 1 and 2 is equal to the distance between firm s 2 and 3. Furthermore it is
assumed that the distance, along the line plotted from the regulation level,
between firm s 3 and 2 is equal to the distance between firm s 2 and 1. So at the
effluent charge E and the regulation level R the level of effluent abatement is
equal. At the effluent charge E notice that no firm can reduce one more unit of
effluents at a lower cost than the last unit reduced by other firm s. However at the
regulation level R firm 3 can reduce its next unit of effluents at a lower cost than
both firm 2 or 1's last unit abated and firm 2 can reduce its next unit of effluents at
a lower cost than firm 1's last unit abated. This shows that effluent charges are a
least cost solution while regulation is not.
w
Graph 1

Source:
w
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The second point is that effluent charges give a greater incentive to prevent
pollution and reduce abatement costs compared to regulation. In graph 2 we have
two marginal control cost curves, the firm 's original curve MCC (Marginal Control
Cost) and a cost curve after some technological advancement MCC*. Under
regulation a firm cannot remove its current abatement equipm ent until the EPA
decides the new equipm ent is better. W hen they do decide it is better the EPA
w ill require the rest of the industry to use this equipm ent as well. So, a firm may
gain a slight advantage in market power or a short term increase in profits
because they were able to begin implem enting this equipm ent sooner. Notice that
when the firm adds this technology under regulation the increase in their profits
are enclosed by the area a, b, and d, but when they add this technology under
effluent charges they increase their profits by the area enclosed by a, b, and c.
Under effluent charges a firm is able to implem ent this technology immediately,
thereby receiving the benefit for a longer period. So not only do they gain a greater
increase in profits or market power from this innovation, they are able to gain
these advantages until another firm can match their innovation. This additional
profit would induce firm s to take risks in developing new technology and finding
ways to reduce pollution initially.
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Graph 2

SOURCE:

The third point is the size of the welfare loss created by a mistaken level of
the policy. Elasticity of the MSB (M arginal Social Benefits) curve and the MCC
curve affect the size of the welfare loss created by the two policies. Effluent
charges lim it the maximum marginal cost that w ill be imposed on a firm for their
effluents regardless of the level produced. Regulation puts a lim it on the amount
of effluents that w ill be produced regardless of the cost to firm s. This is a good
starting point for deciding which policy to use. The more critical it is to reduce
waste, and the less im portant it is that the pertinent industry is negatively affected,
the better regulation is. This can be illustrated by manipulating the basic graph
used earlier. As it becomes more critical to achieve a certain amount of
abatement the marginal social benefits curve becomes less elastic as illustrated in
graph 3. This causes larger social welfare losses from an effluent charge policy,
w

and a sm aller one from a regulation policy. In Graph 3 with MSB 1, an elastic
curve, the welfare loss for MCC1 with an effluent charge is b, d, e where with a
4

regulation policy it is a, b, c. W ith MSB2, an inelastic curve, the welfare loss for
an effluent charge is f, g, h, d where with a regulation policy it is a, f, c. You wilt
see that if you use MCC2 you w ill find the same results.

Graph 3

SOURCE:

The negative effects to the pertinent industry become more profound, as
illustrated in Graph 4 by the marginal control cost function becoming less elastic,
the welfare loss from regulation becomes more severe while the welfare loss from
effluent charges lessens. In Graph 4 with M CC1, an elastic curve, and MSB 1
regulation gives us a welfare loss of a, b, c while the effluent charge gives us a
loss of b, d, e with MCC2, an inelastic curve, and MSB 1 regulation gives us a
welfare loss of a, f, c w hile effluent charges give us a loss of d, f, g, h. You w ill see
that if you use MSB 2 you w ill get the same results.
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Graph 4

SOURCE:

Now that we have seen that effluent charges can be in society's best
interests, we must consider the affected parties. There are three groups of people
who influence policy choice. The first is the general populace. Since our
government is elected, the beliefs of the general populace are an im portant
influence on public policy. The current feeling of the populace seems to be
against the effluent charge. Taxes are rarely supported by the general populace.
Detractors of the policy have also done a good job of convincing people that they
would pay the tax associated with effluent charges. Additionally detractors say
that it w ouldn't have anything to do with cleaning up the environment, but would
ju st increase the income of the government. A specific part of this group is the
environmental groups. They have a strong lobby in W ashington and most of
them if not all are against this policy. They feel it is selling our world and that the
w

people making the decisions w on't be motivated to protect the world as the
environm entalists want.
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A second group is the government. This consists of committees making
recommendations and decisions on environmental issues, the elected officials,
and government agencies like the EPA. The governm ent is also against effluent
charges. This seems to be because of the lack of support by the general
populace and business, as well as the investm ent of tim e, money, and training in
the current system.

Finally, there is business. Business seems to be against effluent charges
as well. The reason for this is not so obvious as the others. Effluent charges
would return the decision process to business. They would be able to decide how
to reduce and how much effluent to reduce. There is evidence to support that this
would actually lower businesses' costs. If this is true, why is business against this
policy and why do econom ist support it? Lets take a closer look at how this policy
would affect individual businesses.

Regulation on how a firm treats its effluents would be removed. A tax on
each unit of effluent would be levied. A firm would then treat each unit of pollutant
that could be treated for a lower cost than the tax. This tax would raise the
Marginal Cost of Production, because in most cases the level of effluents would
be directly related to the level of production and therefore the am ount of the tax
would be directly related to the level of production. However, since firm s would be
allowed to install the pollution abatement equipm ent best suited to them it is
logical to assume they would be able to find less costly means of reducing their
effluents. This would lower their fixed costs. Lets create a model so we can take a
'w

closer look at how this change in MC and FC w ill effect an individual firm .
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First we must list our assumptions.
1)

All variables other than those representing the change in MC and FC for a
change in policies are constant. This is so we can isolate the effect the
change in policies is having on the firm .

2)

All firm s existing w ithin the industry are homogenous, therefore the
industries cost and revenue curves are sim ilar to the firm s. This is to
sim plify the model into a workable form .

3)

The market system is functioning in perfect competition except for the
affects the abatement policies have on it

4)

The only difference between firm s existing in the industry and those
attempting to enter is their fixed cost for pollution reduction. This is to
isolate the affect the change in policy has on the firm .

W

5)

Both policies are implemented perfectly and the same level of abatement is
targeted for both policies. This is to sim plify the model into a workable
form.

6)

AR(Q)=AR(q)=100-Q. The average revenue of the industry is equal to the
average revenue of a firm (The units of course are different but the relation
is the same) This is because of assumption 2 and for the remainder of the
assumptions i w ill only use Q, but this stands for both Q and q. The
formula 100-Q is used because there w ill be no shift in the AR curve
and it keeps the graphs simple.

7)

MR(Q)=d((Q)(AR(Q))/dQ
MR(Q)=d(100Q-Q2)/dQ
MR(Q)=100-2Q

8)

C r(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ+d{+e}. This equation is used as the cost function
under regulation because it creates a curve that closely resembles most
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cost curves in reality. The part in brackets represents the difference
between existing and entering firm s.
9)

ACr(Q)=(aQ3+bQ2+cQ +d{+e»/Q

10)

d(ACr(Q))/dQ=d((aQ3+bQ2+cQ +d{+e»/Q)/dQ
d(ACr(Q))/dQ=((3aQ2+2bQ+c)(Q)-(aQ3+bQ2+cQ +d{+e})(1))/Q2
d(ACr(Q))/dQ=(3aQ3+2bQ2+cQ-aQ3-bQ2-cQ-d{-e})/Q2
d(ACr(Q))/dQ=(2aQ3+bQ2-d{-e})/Q 2

11)

MCr(Q)=d(Cr(Q))/dQ
MCr(Q)=d(aQ3+bQ2+cQ+d{+e})/dQ
MCr(Q)=3aQ2+2bQ+c

12)

Ce(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ +fQ+d+g{+h}. This equation is used as the cost
function under effluent charges because it creates a curve that closely
resembles most cost curves in reality. The part in brackets represents the
difference between existing and entering firms.

13)

ACe(Q)=(aQ3+bQ2+cQ +fQ+d+g{+h})/Q

14)

d(ACe(Q))/dQ=d((aQ3+bQ2+cQ +fQ+d+g{+h})/Q)/dQ
d(ACe(Q))/dQ=((3aQ2+2bQ+c+f)(Q)-(aQ3+bQ2+cQ+fQ+d+g{+h})(1))/Q2
d(ACe(Q))/dQ=(3aQ3+2bQ2+cQ+fQ-aQ3-bQ2-cQ -d-g{-h})/Q 2
d(ACe(Q))/dQ=(2aQ3+bQ2-d-g{-h})/Q 2

15)

MCe(Q)=d(Ce(Q))/dQ
MCe(Q)=d(aQ3+bQ2+cQ +fQ +d+g{+h»/dQ
MCe(Q)=3aQ2+2bQ +c+f

16)

a>0, b<0, and c>0 This is because the MC function should be positive
throughout. It is not reasonable to be able to produce another unit at a 0 or
negative cost. For this to be true its graph, a parabola, must plot as a U not
an inverse U. Hence the coefficient of the

term (a) must be positive.

Furthermore the minimum point, where d(M Cr(Q))/dQ=6aQ+2b=0, must be
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positive. Therefore MC(Q), where Q=-2b/6a=-b/3a, must be positive. This
is definitely a minimum because d2(MCr(Q))/dQ2=6a, and since a>0 it is
always positive. So MCrmjn(Q) = 3a(-b/3a)2+2b(-b/3a)+c = (3ac-b2)/3a
>0. For this to be true 3ac>b2 , and so c>0, because a>0 so if c is not >0
3ac w ill be 0 or negative and therefore not less than b2 since squares are
always positive. W e also know that Q must be positive because you can't
produce a negative output. So Q=-b/3a must be positive. For this to be
true b < 0 because a > 0.
17)

d>0 d represents the fixed costs to a firm , and logically these must usually
be positive.

18)

e>0 Assumed to be positive because it represents additional fixed costs for
a new firm versus an existing firm under a regulation policy.

19)
20)

f>0 Assumed to be positive because represents new tax.
g<0 Assumed to be negative because it represents the reduction in
necessary fixed costs for pollution reduction due to the removal of
government requirements.

21)

h < e represents additional fixed costs for a new firm versus an existing
firm under an effluent charge policy. Since we assume a firm can better
choose technology to reduce their effluents than the government, we
assume h < e. It is also possible for h to be negative because an entering
firm w ill not have certain unamoratized capitol expenditures from obsolete
abatement equipment.

Now lets repeat the form ulas w ithout the explanations for easier reference

w

1)

AR(Q)=100-Q

2)

MR(Q)=100-2Q
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3)

Cr(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ+d{+e}

4)

ACr(Q)=(aQ3+bQ2+CQ+d{+e})/Q

5)

d(ACr(Q))/dQ=(2aQ3+bQ2-d{-e})/Q2

6)

MCr(Q)=3aQ2+2bQ+c

7)

Ce(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ+fQ+d+g{+h}

8)

ACe(Q)=(aQ3+bQ2+cQ+fQ+d+g{+h})/Q

9)

d(ACe(Q))/dQ=(2aQ3+bQ2-d-g{-h})/Q 2

10)

MCe(Q)=3aQ2+2bQ+c+f

11)

a>0

12)

b<0

13)

c>0

14)

3ac>b2

15)

d>0

16)

e>0

17)

f>0

18)

g<0

19)

h<e

Now let us consider how the Industry would look under perfect competition
and monopoly with both these policies. Profit maximization in a com petitive
market occurs where AR=MC. Profit maximization in a monopoly market occurs
at MR=MC. Lets look at how this looks graphically.

li

Graph 5

SOURCE:
\i& /
Lets look at this mathematically.
Q*rm is defined where
100-2Q *rm=3aQ*rm2+2bQ *rm+c or
-2Q *rm=3aQ*rm2+2bQ *rm+c-100 or
Q *rm =(100-(3aQ *rrn2+2bQ *rm+c))/2
Q*emis defined where
100-2Q*em=3aQ*em2+2bQ*em+c+f or
-2Q *em=3aQ*em2+2bQ *em+c+f-100 or
Q*em =(100-(3aQ*em2+2bQ*em+c)V2-(f/2)
Q*rc is defined where
100-Q *rc=3aQ*rc2+2bQ *rc+c or
-Q *rc =3aQ*rc2+2bQ *rc+c-100 or
W

Q *rc

=100-(3aQ *rc2+2bQ *rc+c)

Q*ec is defined where
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100-Q *ec-3 a Q *ec2+2bQ*ec+c+f or
-Q*ec =3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+c+f-100 or
Q*ec =100-(3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+ c)-f
So our Q’ s are
Q 'rm = (100-(3aQ*rm 2+2bQ *rrn+c))/2
Q*em = 0 00-(3aQ *em2+2bQ *em+c)/2)-(f/2)
Q *rc

= 100-(3aQ *rc2+2bQ *rc+c)

Q*ec =100-(3aQ*ec2+2bQ‘ ec+c)-f

Notice that in both perfect com petition and perfect monopoly the difference
in Q* is based solely on f. For perfect monopoly it is -(f/2) when you change to an
effluent charge and for perfect com petition it is -f. Since we have seen that f>0,
notice that a change to an effluent charge would reduce the quantity produced by
the industry in both cases, regardless of the savings on fixed costs.

Lets look at how price is affected mathematically. Since P* is equal to
AR(Q*) lets plug our Q*s into the AR function.

P*rm =100-((100-(3aQ *rm2+2bQ *rm+c))/2)
=100+((-100+(3aQ *rm2+2bQ *rm+c))/2)
=100-(100/2)+(3aQ *rm2+2bQ *rm+c)/2
=50+(3aQ*rm2+2bQ *rm+c)/2
P*em =100-((100-(3aQ*em 2+2bQ*em+c)/2)-(f/2))
=100+((-100+(3aQ ‘ em2+2bQ‘ em+c))/2)+(f/2)
=100-(100/2)+(3aQ *em2+2bQ*em+c)/2+(f/2)

w

=50+(3aQ*em2+2bQ*em +c)/2+(f/2)
P*rc

=100-(100-(3aQ *rc2+2bQ *rc+c))
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=100-100+(3aQ*rc2+2bQ *rc+c)
=(3aQ*rc2+2bQ *rc+c)
P*ec

=100-(100-(3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+c)-f)
=100-100+(3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+c)+f
=(3aQ*ec2+2bQ *ec+c)+f

Notice that once again in both perfect competition and perfect monopoly
the difference in P* is based solely on f. For perfect monopoly it is +(f/2) when
you change to an effluent charge and for perfect competition it is +f. Since we
have seen that f>0, notice that a change to an effluent charge would increase the
price o f goods w ithin the industry in both cases, regardless of the savings on fixed
costs.

W e know though that there are no known cases of a perfect monopoly or
perfect com petition. W hat these prices and quantities really represent is the
parameters w ithin which the market w ill fall. Since we know that the AR curve
represents the price of goods at different quantities and that under our
assum ptions the AR curve is fixed, we know that the market equilibrium w ill be
somewhere between the monopoly and com petitive equilibrium ’s found for each
policy and along the AR curve. Second we have stated earlier in our assumptions
that the market is working in perfect com petition except for the affect that the
abatement policy has on it. This isolates the affect the policies have on
competition.

Now lets look at how the change in costs w ill affect individual firm s in a
w

profit maximizing industry.
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Graph 6

W e see that existing firm s are in equilibrium at the same levels as perfect
com petition. New firm s however although they have the same MC have a
different FC and so different AC. Because it would take a price at the new firm s'
equilibrium to induce entrance into the market and the firm s are profit maximizers
the existing firm s are able to price ju st below this level.

Firms w ill charge a price slightly below the level that new firm s would have
to charge to enter the market. So lets find the price new firm s would need to
charge. First we need to find at what q* their MC=AC. This w ill be their minimum
average cost. So the price, if you plug this into the MC or AC curves, w ill be the
minimum price they would be w illing to sell their product for. So we need to find
q*rn and the q*en and plug them into the ACrn and ACen respectively. W e can
w

then plug them into MCrn and MCen to check our answer.
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q*rn is where
(aq*m3+bq*m 2+cq*rn+cl+e)/q*rn=3aq*rn2+2bq*m+ c o r
(aq*rn2+bq*m+c)+((d+e)/q*rn)=3aq*rn2+2bq*rn+ c o r
(d+e)/q*rn=3aq*m 2+2bq*m +c-(aq*m 2+bq*rn+c) or
(d+e)/q*rn=2aq*m 2+bq*rn or
(d+e)=(2aq*m2+bq*m)q *rn or
(d+e)/(2aq*rn2+bq*m)= q*rn

q*en is where
(a<l*en3+bq*en2+«1*en+fcl‘ en+d+g+h)/cl*en=3aq*en2+2bq*en+ c + for
(aq*en2+bcl*en+c+f)+ ((d+g+ h)/q*en)=3aq*en2+2bq*en+c+f or
(d+g+h)/q*en=3aq*en2+2bq*en+c+f-(aq*en2+bq*en+c+f)o r
(d+g+h)/q*en=2aq*en2+bq*en or
(d+g+h)=(2aq*en2+bq*en)q *enor
(d+g+h)/(2aq*en2+bq*en)=q*en

Notice that the difference between q*rn and q*en 's related only to the
difference between d+e and d+g+h. In other words it is the difference in total fixed
costs for an entering firm that affects the quantity a firm produces.

Now lets find the prices caused by these policies.
P*rn ‘s ^

ACrn(q*rn)=(a(q*rn)3+b(q*rn)2+c(q*rn) +d+e)/q*rn
P*en is at
ACen(q*en)= (a(q*en)3+b(q*en)2+c(q*en)+f(q*en)+d+3+ h)/'q*en
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Since q*rn and q*en are being plugged into the formula we know that the
total fixed costs w ill affect the difference in price. Once again the total fixed costs
are involved in this form ula specifically. In addition the change in marginal costs
affect the price.

Given that we know the constants in these form ulas we can estimate the
affect a change in policy would have on price and quantity. W hat is more
important, however, is how this change affects a firm 's economic profits. W e now
know what quantity a firm w ill produce under both policies. Their economic profits
w ill be equal to this value m ultiplied by the difference between the market price
minus AC for the firm at that q and under that policy. Mathem atically this is.
(qm K((a((qrn))3+b((qm ))2+c((q m » +d+e)/(qm))-((a(((qrn))3+b((qm ))2+c((clrn))

: ,

+d)/(qm))) =(qrn)(«/qrn)=eThe economic profit for a firm under effluent charges is.
(qen)((a((qen))3+b((qen))2+c((qen))+ f((qen))+d+g+h)/(qen))((a((qen))3+b((qen))2+c((qen))+f((qen))+d+g)/(qen))=(qen)(h/(qen))=h

Notice that neither the change in marginal costs nor the change in an
existing firm 's fixed costs has any effect on a firm 's profits. O nly the change in the
additional fixed costs an entering firm has affects the profits. So, if h < e, the
form er assumptions are in place, and firm s are profit maximizers, those firm s who
aren't afraid of failing w ill be against effluent charges.

Lets repeat the findings. The parameters of the market are affected by the
change in marginal cost alone. The change in quantity produced by a firm is
w

affected by the change in the total fixed costs of a firm trying to enter the market.
The market price w ill be affected by both the change in total costs of entering firm s
17

and the change in marginal costs. Finally, the change in economic profits w ill be
affected solely by the change in the additional fixed costs an entering firm would
face compared to an existing firm .

Creating public policy to protect our environm ent is a complex process.
There are several reasons to believe effluent charges could be an effective
alternative to regulation. First, it is a least cost solution. Second, it creates
incentive to prevent pollution. Third as the MSB curve becomes more elastic and
or the MCC curve becomes less elastic the welfare loss from a mistake in
regulation becomes more profound while the loss from a mistake with an effluent
charge lessens. These points show how effluent charges can be a better choice
than regulation.

Still support for effluent charges is not there. The general populace is
afraid that the policy w ill be implemented in a way that causes more damage than
good. The government supports the policies it already has a large investment in.
Business realizes that it w ill often reduce barriers to entry thereby reducing their
economic profits. The way effluent charges are perceived w ill have to go through
a great deal of change before any large scale policy involving them is adopted.

I feel that effluent charges should be added to the EPA’s choice of policy. It
is an efficient policy in theory, and could be used very effectively on large scale
problems with low costs o f abatement. Effluent charges should com plim ent rather
than replace regulation. Between regulation and effluent charges a very complete
and adaptable policy could be created to deal with the negative externality
problems of production.

The real problem with effluent charges is their implementation. As with any
policy offered in this area, the potential to alter it for individual gain is immense.
Several areas stand out. The first is the problem with measuring effluents. One
answer is to put that responsibility on the firm . This could be successful, but only
if there were severe penalties for fraud aimed at the people responsible. A second
problem is setting the proper tax. There is the potential of the people in charge of
setting the tax having personal interests involved with the firm s involved or the
environmental groups, etc. In addition if the people who set the tax are
responsible or are under the supervision of those responsible for spending the
revenues you again have the possibility that the tax w on't be set to attain the
proper pollution level.

Effluent charges deserve a more in depth look. They are probably the best
choice of policy in many cases. They are efficient and transfer the costs to those
that receive the benefits. W hen properly implemented they w ill greatly improve
the governm ent's capability to internalize the negative externality of pollution.
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